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Executive Summary  
S1. This report presents the findings of a study undertaken by Itad for DFID to critically 
review the methods used to evaluate M4P programmes and thereby help guide the 
design and implementation of future evaluations. 
 
Scope of this review 
S2. The review compiled information about the scope and purpose of evaluations of 
M4P programmes and analysed the trends, strengths, and weaknesses of these. The 
reviewers analysed 32 M4P programme reviews and evaluations, monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) frameworks and programme reports, including 14 evaluation 
reports, and consulted with 14 individuals and organisations in the field.  
 
S3. M4P programmes are defined as playing a facilitative, adaptive role in order to 
contribute to systemic, large scale and sustainable market changes that positively affect 
the poor. The nature of the approach and the complexity of the markets within 
which it operates present a number of challenges for evaluation. Evaluation 
approaches that address these challenges are needed to avoid inaccurate estimations of 
impact.  
 
Key findings 
S4. The M4P evaluations reviewed here were generally weak in terms of: 
• consideration of systemic, sustainable changes in market systems; 
• data quality (small sample sizes with little consideration of sampling frames, 
statistical significance or bias); 
• triangulation practices (particularly with regard to qualitative data collection); 
• the use of theories of change (those used were often linear, not externally vetted, 
with assumptions not adequately tested); 
• consistency in units for facilitating accurate aggregation; and 
• consideration of unintended negative effects. 
 
Recommendations for practice 
1. Evaluation method (how)  
S5. Evaluations that assess the extent to which M4P interventions result in market 
changes which are systemic, large scale and sustainable can serve to both ‘improve’ 
M4P programmes (through facilitating adaptive management) and ‘prove’ results for 
accountability. The majority of M4P evaluations reviewed here did not adequately 
assess impact in terms of whether it was systemic, large scale and sustainable. Those 
that were most successful at doing so were based on a theory of change that explicitly 
incorporated systemic change and evaluated results through a mixed-methods 
approach.  
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S6. A theory of change-based approach to evaluation can help establish whether the 
linkages between interventions and intended impacts are plausible, account for other 
contributory factors, and capture unintended effects. Theories of change should be 
revisited frequently and vetted by stakeholders external to the project. While the 
majority of M4P evaluations were based on a theory of change, most of these 
evaluations did not adequately test the linkages contained in the theory.  
 
S7. The use of mixed methods in evaluation mitigates the risk of over-relying on one 
or two sources of evidence in the face of unpredictability. It is important for mixed 
methods approaches to be conducted with the same rigour and attention normally 
given to experimental approaches in order to minimise bias and ensure credibility. 
The majority of M4P evaluations were weak in terms of their qualitative data 
collection practices, reducing the reliability and robustness of their findings.  
Increased attention to rigorous qualitative data collection approaches is recommended 
for M4P evaluations.   
 
S8. Quasi-experimental approaches can be useful for measuring specific stages in the 
results chain or assessing discreet interventions at the pilot stage (before effects 
multiply) but face a number of challenges in terms of timing and location due to the 
adaptable, nonlinear nature of M4P approaches. They are not suited to assessing the 
extent to which market changes are systemic, large scale or sustainable. 
 
S9. The complex nature of market systems and the systemic nature of M4P interventions 
mean that adequately assessing unintended effects (both positive and negative) is 
crucial in M4P evaluations. There was considerable scope for improvement here in 
all of the evaluations reviewed.   
 
S10. Finally, evaluations need to examine more closely the impact and effectiveness of the 
facilitative and adaptive approach to M4P programmes – this is often held to be the 
key to the success of M4P programmes and yet has not been effectively measured or 
evaluated to date. 
 
2. Evaluation timing  (when) 
S11. In order to both estimate contribution in the context of other contributory factors 
and assess long-term changes, evaluation needs to happen both (a) during the 
programme, to ensure contributions are measurable and help facilitate an adaptive 
approach, and (b) later on (at the end or post-project), when systemic, long-term 
change has had time to unfold. 
 
3. Evaluation responsibilities (who) 
S12. Institutional arrangements that ensure both objectivity in the evaluation and in-depth 
understanding of interventions and the context are important considerations for M4P 
evaluations. Approaches to achieve this balance include longitudinal evaluations 
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through which the evaluator and evaluand build a collaborative relationship and/or 
internal data collection with external audits (i.e. the approach advocated by the 
DCED Standard). 
 
4. Evaluation level  (what) 
S13. Programmes can be evaluated at an intervention level or programme wide level. 
Where the intention is to demonstrate impact of the programme as a whole, a 
combination of top-down (programme-wide) and bottom-up (intervention specific) 
measurement is likely to address the inherent drawbacks of each approach to results 
measurement. 
Introduction 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 A market systems approach to international development, often referred to as the 
‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ (M4P) approach, is being increasingly applied by 
many international development agencies. At the same time, agencies are placing 
greater emphasis on the need for evidence on the effectiveness of their investments. 
This has led to increasing demands for M4P programmes to better demonstrate results. 
 
1.2 Significant efforts have been made to develop improved approaches to results 
measurement of M4P programmes, including through the development of the DCED 
Standard for Results Measurement1 (a framework for private enterprise programmes to 
measure, manage, and demonstrate results) and the commissioning of a growing 
number of independent evaluations.  
 
1.3 In this context, DFID commissioned Itad to critically review the methods used to 
evaluate M4P programmes and provide recommendations for good practice to help 
guide the design and implementation of future evaluations. The findings of the review 
are presented in this report. The review compiled information about the scope and 
purpose of evaluations of M4P programmes and analysed the trends, strengths, and 
weaknesses of these. The reviewers analysed 32 M4P programme reviews and 
evaluations, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks and programme reports in 
terms of evaluation scope, quality of evidence and key findings. The team also 
consulted with 14 individuals and organisations about the strengths, weaknesses and 
trends in M4P evaluation2.  
 
1.4 The report is structured as follows: 
• Section 2 lays out the definitions of evaluation and of M4P which guided this 
review. 
• Section 3 explores the characteristics of M4P evaluations in terms of why 
evaluations are performed, who performs the evaluation, when the evaluation take 
place and what is evaluated. 
• Section 4 presents an analysis of M4P evaluation methods, their strengths and 
weaknesses of current approaches to M4P evaluation.  
• Section 5 summarises the conclusions and recommendations of the review. 
                                                          
1 http://www.enterprise-development.org/page/measuring-and-reporting-results  
2 Annex 3 provides a summary of the 14 evaluations of M4P programmes that were considered in the review. In addition to 
the documents listed in Annex 3, a large number of programme reviews, case studies, M&E frameworks and guidelines were 
reviewed and have fed into our overall findings. These are listed in Annex 1. However the content of many of these 
documents was not suitable for summary in the template used for Annex 3. 
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2. Defining evaluation and M4P 
2.1 Defining ‘evaluation’ 
2.1 The OECD DAC defines evaluation as: “…an assessment, as systematic and objective 
as possible, of an on-going or completed project, programme or policy, its design, 
implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of 
objectives, developmental efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An 
evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the 
incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both recipients 
and donors” (OECD DAC 1991). 
 
2.2 For the purpose of the review, we have taken a wide interpretation of the definition of 
evaluation to ensure that we pick up lessons from a range of external process and 
impact evaluations, as well as programme reviews and internal results measurement 
processes (including monitoring guidelines and internal monitoring reports). The 
review has considered the following sub-categories of a broad definition of 
‘evaluation’, each of which implies a different institutional model for the relationship 
between the evaluator and the evaluand (see Table 1).  
• Internal results measurement. 
• One-off independent evaluations or reviews. 
• Independent impact evaluations. 
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Table 1: Alternative institutional arrangements for evaluation 
Approach Strengths Weaknesses Documents 
reviewed 
Internal results 
measurement 
The majority of results 
measurement and impact 
assessment is undertaken 
internally (sometimes 
with support from 
external consultants). 
This increasingly follows 
the DCED Standard 
under which the results 
measurement system is 
periodically audited 
externally to ensure 
credibility of the results 
reported. In the case of 
Katalyst, which currently 
favours this approach, the 
programme occasionally 
commissions discreet 
intervention-specific 
impact assessments from 
external parties. 
External engagement in 
results measurement 
inputs more targeted. 
Internal adaptive 
management more 
easily facilitated.  
In-depth knowledge of 
programme and context 
because of involvement 
of implementers in 
results measurement. 
Timing more tailored 
to specific interventions 
(but no reason why 
longitudinal evaluations 
can’t do this if managed 
well). 
Risks of bias in 
results, for example 
due to: 
• Self-importance 
bias3. 
• Incentives of 
implementers to 
inflate success. 
The review 
considered the 
internal results 
measurement 
practices of a 
wide range of 
donors and 
implementing 
agencies, 
through a 
variety of 
guidelines, 
monitoring 
reports and 
other similar 
documents. 
One-off independent 
evaluations or reviews 
These are generally 
undertaken at the mid-
point or end of the 
programme. While some 
may entail independent 
data collection, this type 
of evaluation typically 
relies on project 
monitoring and 
High degree of 
objectivity, although 
rigour depends on data 
collection and analysis 
processes. 
Normally rely on 
secondary data and 
often limited 
verification of the 
quality of the data. 
Often superficial and 
not quantitative. 
One-off nature 
means that they are 
limited in their 
ability to track 
The review 
analysed five 
external process 
evaluations 
which reviewed 
the way in 
which the 
programme was 
implemented as 
well as the 
achievement of 
outputs, 
                                                          
3 White & Phillips (2012). 
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Approach Strengths Weaknesses Documents 
reviewed 
secondary data. The 
evaluations often apply a 
‘process’ approach, 
focusing on the process of 
implementation, i.e. the 
way in which the 
interventions work, 
rather than concentrating 
on the achievement or 
non‐achievement of 
objectives. 
longitudinal change 
with rigour. 
Risk that external 
and short term 
involvement will 
lead to a lack of 
ownership of the 
findings within the 
programme which 
may compromise the 
extent to which 
findings are 
internalised. 
outcomes and 
impacts. 
Independent impact 
evaluations  
These generally aim to 
look beyond the 
immediate results of 
programmes to identify 
longer-term effects. This 
is a model increasingly 
adopted by DFID for 
M4P programmes.   
 
 
High degree of 
objectivity. 
Generally apply 
quantitative rigour.  
Long term engagement 
of evaluator can 
provide opportunity for 
them to develop 
familiarity with the 
programme. 
Too much distance 
and short inputs 
mean evaluators can 
miss context. 
Risk of lack of 
internal ownership of 
evaluation findings. 
Limited application 
for adaptive 
management.  
 
The review 
included 
analysis of five 
external impact 
evaluations 
which we 
define as impact 
evaluations that 
were conducted 
by a party 
independent of 
the donor or 
implementation 
agency.  
 
2.2 Defining M4P  
2.3 The M4P approach is based on recognition that economic poverty is the result of the 
structure of market systems in which poor participate. When markets work efficiently 
and produce equitable outcomes for the poor, they are a powerful vehicle for 
delivering growth and poverty reduction. The M4P approach aims to sustainably 
improve the lives of the poor by analysing and influencing market systems that affect 
them as business people (in terms of higher margins, increased volumes and improved 
market access), consumers (in the form of better access to products and services, lower 
prices and wider choice) and employees (in the form of higher wages and improved 
working conditions). It works to identify the underlying causes, instead of symptoms, 
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of why markets do not work for the poor. M4P activities aim to facilitate change to 
the behaviour, capabilities, incentives and relationships of market actors in order to: 
• improve target market systems, and 
• create the conditions for markets to be continuously strengthened after the M4P 
‘intervention’ is completed. 
 
2.4 M4P is a flexible approach to development rather than a defined instrument. It has 
application in both economic and social fields. Building on a wide range of experience 
and learning, it recognises both the achievements and limitations of many conventional 
(i.e. more direct delivery) approaches and the growing number of diverse, successful 
applications of M4P4. There are therefore no textbook M4P projects or blueprints for 
intervention, since intervention choices should emerge based on needs and context.  
 
2.5 The M4P literature is broadly consistent in specifying the key attributes that define the 
approach. In terms of the methods of implementation, M4P programmes play a 
facilitative, adaptive role. In terms of the impacts they seek to achieve, M4P 
programmes aim to contribute to systemic, large scale and sustainable changes that 
positively affect the poor. Each of these attributes is described below5.  
 
Implementation Approach: 
2.6 Facilitative role: M4P programmes aim to adopt a facilitative role, acting as a catalyst 
to stimulate, but not displace, market functions or players, thereby ‘crowding in’ 
market players and activity. Achieving this requires a rigorous analysis of complex 
social, political or economic systems to ensure that programme designers think about 
the incentives and interests that encourage individuals to undertake particular roles or 
functions in systems. Transforming complex systems sustainably is often about finding 
subtle, innovative and enduring ways to respond to and change incentives or challenge 
particular interests, rather than directly orchestrating shifts in behaviour en masse. 
  
2.7 Adaptive in nature: The dynamic and unpredictable nature of market systems means 
that programmes need to be flexible and presents a strong case for an experimental and 
adaptive approach.   
 
  
                                                          
4 Springfield Centre (undated). 
5 Whilst these attributes are relatively easy to describe, the degree to which a programme’s interventions are consistent with 
them is difficult to assess objectively, particularly in the context of a desk-based exercise where limited information was 
available to the reviewers. The review applied a generous interpretation of compliance with these attributes in the selection of 
“M4P programmes” that were considered to ensure that it was comprehensive and drew lessons from a wide range of relevant 
programmes and evaluations. 
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Desired Impacts: 
2.8 Systemic change is defined as transformations in the structure or dynamics of a 
system that leads to impacts on the material conditions or behaviours of large numbers 
of people. M4P focuses on systemic action: understanding where market systems are 
failing to serve the needs of the poor, and acting to correct those failings. The 
approach takes account of interrelationships in the market system and targets 
interventions at critical weaknesses in the system.   
 
2.9 Sustainability: M4P seeks sustainable change from the outset - delivering sustainable 
outcomes by better aligning key market functions and players with the incentives and 
capacities to work more effectively. Sustainability is not just about maintaining the 
status quo achieved by a project intervention without continued external support. It is 
also about the long-term integrity of dynamic processes, the resilience of the system to 
shocks and stresses, and the capacity to evolve or innovate in response to an inevitably 
changing external environment. This dynamic dimension to sustainability is very 
important because it suggests that underpinning the outward or superficial performance 
of any ‘sustainable’ system are a variety of critical but often less visible institutions and 
functions. 
 
2.10 Large-scale: M4P programmes are designed to achieve large-scale change, benefitting 
large numbers of poor people beyond the programme’s direct sphere of interaction. 
Interventions explicitly envisage mechanisms for replicating, extending or multiplying 
results so that, at least potentially, they could reach very large numbers of beneficiaries. 
It is not that every intervention has to directly reach the large scale, but rather that the 
envisaged route to large-scale impact is credible. Whatever scaling up logic is envisaged 
should be explicit in the design of programmes and interventions.  
 
2.11 These attributes of M4P programmes have been used to structure the analysis of 
evaluation methods provided in this report in Section 4. 
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3. Characteristics of M4P evaluations 
3.1 This section considers the characteristics of M4P evaluations by looking at questions of 
why evaluations are performed, who performs the evaluation, when the evaluation 
takes place and what is evaluated. 
 
3.1 Why: evaluation purpose 
3.2 Evaluations are often seen to have two primary purposes: improving programme 
implementation or proving programme effectiveness. There can potentially be tensions 
between these purposes, including balancing degrees of usefulness and credibility 
(Creevey et al 2010), which relates to issues of independence versus an in-depth 
understanding of the programme and the context (Tarsilla 2010), the indicators used 
for measurement, the timing of the evaluation, and other concerns. Given that many 
evaluations do not fit neatly into one category or another it is useful to think of them 
along a spectrum, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Evaluation purpose spectrum 
 
 
3.3 Improving: Evaluation used for ‘improving’ practice is typically focused on how and 
why change has happened and how the programme can adapt and improve (i.e. 
organisational or programmatic learning) in order to maximise its effectiveness 
(Osorio-Cortes and Jenal 2013). This requires significant focus on the processes and 
changes in the system (e.g. rules, incentives, relationships, capacity, and practice) rather 
than the final impacts at the household or enterprise level (e.g. income or poverty). 
Evaluations focused on ‘improving’ are often carried out by teams that include 
members of the implementing organisation, though can also be facilitated externally.  
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3.4 Due to the experimental nature of many M4P programmes, evaluation that provides 
real-time information to facilitate adaptive management can help contribute to 
improved programme performance. Impact assessments (either internal or external) 
conducted partway through implementation fall into this category. Many programmes 
have an adaptive and responsive internal research programme (e.g. Katalyst), that 
includes impact assessment, which is intended to direct programme planning.  
 
3.5 Proving: Evaluations focused on ‘proving’ results are typically used for accountability 
and cost-effectiveness reasons: they seek to understand the overall impacts of the 
programme. These tend to be ex post evaluations which often seek to ascertain 
attribution: the changes that have occurred as a result of the intervention (Kandhker et 
al 2010). Information from these evaluations might inform decisions for continuing, 
scaling up, or replicating programmes. They are typically conducted by teams external 
to the intervention for the sake of objectivity, though the need for an in-depth 
understanding of both the intervention and the context is often required to ensure 
accurate capture of effects (Tarsilla 2010). 
 
Recommendations for good practice 
From stakeholder consultations and a review of existing evaluation practice, in the case of 
M4P programmes, it appears that the best evaluation approaches need to serve both ‘proving’ 
and ‘improving’ functions. Improving inevitably cuts across the responsibilities of both 
programme managers and evaluators and therefore collaboration between these two parties is 
required. The improving focus of mid-term evaluations should be on strengthening the 
efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery. The improving focus of final evaluations 
should be on generating learning regarding the M4P delivery model and therefore improving 
its future application. 
The implications of this on the institutional arrangements, timing and selection of 
interventions that are included in the evaluation are considered in turn below.   
 
3.2 Who: Responsibilities for evaluation   
3.6 Many M4P programmes simultaneously apply a variety of models for ‘evaluation’ (i.e. 
internal evaluation, external review, and independent impact assessment, as detailed in 
Table 1 above). Interestingly, none of the evaluations involved a long-term, sustained 
collaboration between evaluator and evaluand: all of the 14 evaluations reviewed were 
either one-off externally conducted evaluations or were largely conducted internally.  
 
3.7 An alternative way of categorising evaluations is according to whether data is collected 
and analysed internally or externally. Of the 14 evaluations reviewed, eight were based 
primarily or exclusively on internally collected data, one was based on secondary data, 
and five used externally collected data. This is detailed in Table 2 below. 
Unsurprisingly, independent impact evaluations all rely on externally collected data, 
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whereas internal results measurement uses internally generated data. External reviews 
apply a variety of models for data collection and analysis, and a reliance on internally 
collected data is not uncommon.  
 
3.8 Whilst independence on the part of an evaluator is desirable for objectivity, for M4P 
evaluation, it is equally important that the evaluator has in-depth knowledge of 
interventions and context, given the complex nature of the programmes and markets. 
Internal data collection can bring this familiarity with the programme and also 
maximise the chances that evaluation findings are internalised. However, internal data 
collection is subject to risks of bias.    
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Table 2: Responsibilities for data collection and analysis in M4P evaluations 
reviewed 
Evaluation Report6  Internal External Evaluation 
type 
1. Katalyst Impact 
Assessment 
Data 
collection 
 X 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation Data analysis  X 
2. Cambodia MSME final 
M&E report 
Data 
collection 
 X 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation Data analysis  X 
3. AgLink Egypt final report 
 Data 
collection 
X 
Supplemented by 
stakeholder 
interviews 
 External 
review 
Data analysis X  
4. PrOpCom Project 
Completion Report 
Data 
collection 
X  
Internal 
results 
measurement Data analysis X  
5. SECO Cooperation in 
Business Environment 
Reform, 
 
Data 
collection 
X  
External 
review 
Data analysis  X 
6. Impacts of the KBDS & 
KHDP projects in the tree 
fruit value chain in Kenya 
 
Data 
collection 
 X Independent 
impact 
evaluation Data analysis  X 
7. Effectiveness assessment 
of the GMED India project 
Data 
collection 
X  
Independent 
impact 
evaluation   X 
8. Second Thanh Hoa 
bamboo  survey 
Data 
collection 
X  
Independent 
impact 
evaluation Data analysis  X 
9. PrOpCom tractor leasing 
case study report 
Data 
collection 
X  
Internal 
results 
measurement Data analysis X  
                                                          
6 See Annex 3 for full titles of the evaluation reports. 
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Evaluation Report6  Internal External Evaluation 
type 
10. Enter-Growth Project 
Sri Lanka, Final Evaluation 
Data 
collection 
X 
Supplemented by 
external 
stakeholder 
consultations 
 External 
review 
Data analysis  X 
11. PROFIT Zambia 
Impact Assessment Final 
Report 
Data 
collection 
 X 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation Data analysis  X 
12. Joint SDC – Irish Aid 
Review of the Mekong 
Market Development 
Portfolio Programme 
(MMDPP) 
Data 
collection 
Mixed team 
Internal 
results 
measurement Data analysis X  
13. Enterprise Challenge 
Fund Mid-term review 
Data 
collection 
X 
Supplemented by 
external 
stakeholder 
consultations, field 
visits 
 External 
review 
Data analysis  X 
14. Cross-section of 
independent evaluations in 
PSD 2007 GTZ 
Data 
collection 
 X External 
review 
Data analysis X  
 
3.9 From stakeholder consultations, there appear to be three different institutional 
arrangements that can provide the necessary balance of objectivity and distance:  
• Internal data collection verified through an independent DCED Standard 
audit and occasionally supplemented by discreet impact evaluations. This is 
currently favoured by Katalyst. DCED audit provides assurance regarding 
monitoring processes and includes analysis of the way in which impact is attributed 
to the programme. DCED Standard audits supplement the external evaluation 
process, but the audits do not necessarily address donor-specific evaluation 
questions, or make use of donor-preferred evaluation methodologies.   
• A longitudinal collaboration between evaluator and evaluand. This model 
is being increasingly adopted by DFID and can help ensure a desirable combination 
of independence, relevance and utility of M4P evaluations. However, there are no 
historical examples of this arrangement from which to draw lessons. 
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• The use of a pool of external evaluators who have in-depth knowledge of the 
M4P approach, but who are sufficiently distanced from programmes and 
implementing teams to avoid bias. However, stakeholders pointed to the scarcity of 
such a pool, which creates challenges in the application of this approach.  
 
3.10 The appropriate institutional model is partly dependent on the scale of the programme 
and the resources available for evaluation. Clearly a larger programme is more likely to 
have available the resources required for external longitudinal evaluation than smaller 
programmes. The review found that the M&E budget for an M4P programme is 
typically in the region of 6-9%, of which around 50% is normally spent on internal 
monitoring and 50% on external evaluation or impact assessment.  
 
Recommendations for good practice  
Evaluators need to be both (a) sufficiently familiar with M4P approaches to design 
appropriate evaluations, and (b) sufficiently distanced from the programme in order to 
provide the required degree of independence. This was stressed repeatedly by stakeholders in 
our consultations as a key factor in ensuring relevance and accuracy of M4P evaluations, and 
is also advocated by Tarsilla (2010). Thus, internal results data collection and analysis with 
external audits and/or longitudinal collaborations is preferred over purely internal or purely 
external evaluation arrangements.  
The appropriate model is partly dependent on the context of the programme and the 
resources available. For larger M4P programmes (e.g. valued at over £10 million), a 
combination of internal monitoring with external audits and longitudinal external evaluation 
is in many cases likely to be optimal. Where this is the case, the approach should ideally 
include: 
• The appointment of the evaluator at the beginning of the project; 
• Collaboration between the project team and evaluator on reviewing the theory of 
change and the monitoring data that will be gathered for the project; 
• Agreement on the programme of “evaluative learning”/research that will be 
conducted and the division of responsibilities for this work between the project team 
and evaluator; 
• Agreement on the application of the DCED standard and its impact on the scope of 
the evaluator's work. 
 
3.3 When: Timing of the evaluation  
3.11 The timing of the evaluation and data collection determine the type of information 
provided and the ways in which it can be used. Data can be collected ex-ante, mid-
project, end-project and post-project.  
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3.12 Around half of the evaluations reviewed here were conducted during project 
implementation, implying that the balance of purpose was more towards ‘improving’. 
The other half of the evaluations analysed in this review were conducted at the end of 
the project. For these, the implication is that the emphasis was on ‘proving’ and 
providing information for wider lesson-learning external to the project.  
 
3.13 The review did not uncover any evaluations that had been conducted post-project (i.e. 
two or more years following project completion). As much of the impact of M4P 
interventions is achieved after programme intervention has completed, evaluations 
conducted during implementation or at completion are likely to only identify full 
change at certain levels in the results chain. There is therefore a risk that they will 
underestimate impact and be unable to effectively assess whether changes have been 
systemic and sustainable. However, clearly, the degree of attributable change will 
reduce over time as the influence of other contextual factors builds. 
 
3.14 The timing of different levels of effect is difficult to predict and there is a trade-off in 
selecting the timeframe for the follow-up data collection and analysis. With too short a 
period between the before and after surveys, the impacts may not have had time to 
take hold and may not be measurable. But with too long a time period between the 
before and after surveys, the amount of attrition in the panel of respondents may 
distort the results.  
 
3.15 For example, an evaluation of Katalyst interventions7 identified that impacts will occur 
at the wholesale service provider level first, then at the retail service provider level, and 
only after the retail-level service providers have adopted and promoted the innovations 
could we expect to see change at the end-user beneficiary level. Furthermore, the type 
of impact we could expect to observe would itself reflect the behavioural change 
pattern. We would first expect to see increases in knowledge about a new technique or 
practice, then changes in attitudes about adopting or using the new technique or 
practice, then changes in terms of actual behaviour in implementing the practice. Only 
after the practice is implemented would changes in production, productivity, income, 
employment and standard of living occur.   
 
3.16 Similarly, in a meta-evaluation of business training and entrepreneurship 
interventions8, it was highlighted that whilst one might expect firms to make some 
changes relatively quickly after training, the full impact of training may take some 
time. However, firms could start some practices and then drop them, so that surveys 
which measure what is taking place in the business only several years after training may 
miss the period of experimentation. Ideally, then studies should trace the trajectories of 
impacts, measuring both short and longer-term effects. However the majority of 
                                                          
7 Magill, JH & G Woller (2010). 
8 McKenzie D & C Woodruff (2012). 
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studies take a single follow-up survey, providing a snapshot of information on the 
training impact, but no details on the trajectory of impacts. 
 
Recommendations for good practice  
• For M4P programmes, evaluation needs to happen both (a) during the programme, 
to ensure contributions are measurable and help facilitate an adaptive approach, and 
(b) later on (at the end or post-project), when systemic, long-term change has had 
time to unfold. This justifies the application of a longitudinal approach to evaluation.   
• The theory of change and logframe should clearly indicate when the expected 
impacts are likely to occur and define the anticipated “trajectory of change”9. These 
assumptions should then be used to determine the evaluation strategy and timing at 
the start of the project. However it is important to recognise that unexpected change 
is almost inevitable due to the unpredictability of market dynamics; and that as such, 
deviations from the anticipated trajectory of change should not necessarily be 
considered negatively. 
 
3.4 What: Selection of interventions for evaluation 
3.17 Many M4P programmes apply a ‘portfolio approach’ where multiple interventions are 
implemented under one programme. A testing and piloting approach is applied where 
successful interventions are pursued further and/or replicated, and unsuccessful 
interventions are dropped. In evaluating such multi-stranded programmes, there is an 
option of either evaluating the entire programme’s impact (i.e. ‘top-down’ 
measurement, which assesses the key changes in indicators at the impact level and then 
analyses the factors at the market level that have driven this change) or focusing on a 
handful of interventions (i.e. ‘bottom-up’ measurement, whereby intervention-based 
monitoring is applied to assess whether and how interventions have achieved market 
level change and the extent to which this has led to an improvement in the 
performance and inclusiveness of the market system). There are advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach (see Box 1). 
 
  
                                                          
9 See Woolcock (2009). 
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Box 1: Bottom-up and top-down measurement challenges 
Bottom-up measurement (intervention-
based) 
Top-down measurement 
(programme-based) 
Risk of double counting impact across 
interventions. 
Risk that measurement will ignore deadweight 
loss and displacement. 
Difficult to account for impact of synergies 
across different components of a programme. 
Risk of ‘self-importance bias’ in estimating 
attribution. 
Very challenging/costly to make surveys 
& quantitative analysis representative. 
Large attribution challenges – big jump 
between micro interventions and macro 
economy-wide impacts. 
Source: Itad (2012) 
 
3.18 The pros and cons of both the bottom-up and top-down approaches to evaluation 
have resulted in suggestions that the two should be combined (e.g. ITAD 2012).  
 
Bottom-Up (Intervention specific) Approach 
3.19 Where only a selection of interventions can be evaluated, a variety of approaches to 
intervention sampling can be applied:  
• Random sampling: Some argue for random sampling to reduce selection bias. For 
example, DCED audits (e.g. in the case of Katalyst) take a square root of the total 
number of interventions and select a random sample. Others argue for ‘hand-
picking’ of interventions – deliberately selecting either success stories or failures.  
• Evaluating success: The justification for focusing on successful interventions is that 
the experimental and ‘portfolio approach’ of an M4P programme often means that 
the majority of overall impact from a programme is likely to come from a small 
number of interventions. The implication is that a random selection of 
interventions could miss the major areas of impact that a programme achieves. 
However a challenge in ‘hand picking’ successful interventions in longitudinal 
evaluations is that an evaluator will not know in advance which interventions will 
be a success and therefore for which interventions a baseline should be developed. 
• Evaluating failure: An opposing view, which has recently been discussed in the 
wider context of evaluation in international development suggests that “the role of 
evidence is not to prove that things work, but to prove they don’t, forcing us to challenge 
received wisdom and standard approaches” 10. This suggests that learning is most likely 
to be effective from failure, in a context where there are strong incentives for 
                                                          
10 http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=13590  
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programme implementers and donors to not be open about failure, which results in 
systemic bias (Sarewitz 2012, Ioannidis 2005). This has been a driver behind the 
“Admitting Failure” initiative11 of Engineers Without Borders, which includes 
documentation of failure in at least one M4P programme (PROFIT in Zambia12). 
 
Box 2: The importance of capturing failure 
“It’s only when we reached the stage when we were admitting that it was not working that 
we started to learn...Failure is painful to admit. And a lot of people that are in development 
work push an intervention just because they need to keep the numbers on and they don’t 
admit it in a report on the table”. 
Carity Ngoma, discussing learning from failures in the PROFIT Zambia programme. 
 
3.20 Of the evaluations reviewed, seven analysed the full set of interventions implemented 
by the programme, whilst seven selected a sample. The basis for the selection of a 
sample of interventions is not always made clear in the evaluation report. Examples of 
the approach to intervention sample selection where it is explicitly explained are 
provided below: 
• The PROFIT Zambia impact assessment selected interventions based on an 
evaluability assessment at the start of the evaluation. However, because the location 
for one of the interventions shifted over time, and the evaluation had employed a 
longitudinal target and control group approach, the evaluation of one of the 
interventions was not effective.   
• The Cambodia MSME M&E report took a random sample for the before/after 
analysis that was undertaken.  
• The PrOpCom PCR focused primarily on the interventions that enjoyed the 
greatest success through the long life of the project (and whose implementation 
was therefore maintained through to the latter years of its implementation).  
• The Katalyst impact assessment examined four of the approximately forty 
activities carried out under the Katalyst/DBSM programme. The evaluation report 
states that “these activities were selected for practical reasons – their timing, 
duration, and magnitude”13.  
 
                                                          
11 http://www.admittingfailure.com/  
12 http://www.admittingfailure.com/failure/charity-ngoma/  
13 Timing was important because the study needed to assess projects that were just beginning or that had not progressed to a 
stage at which meaningful baseline data could not be collected. Magnitude was important because the activity had to have the 
potential of causing a measurable impact in the targeted beneficiary population. And duration was important because there 
needed to be a sufficient period of activity to project measurable impacts. Many of Katalyst’s ongoing activities were mature 
programmes that offered no possibility of collecting needed a priori information or baseline data. Others were too limited in 
scope and time to serve in a longitudinal study. 
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3.21 None of the evaluations reviewed here explicitly evaluated failure. Given the 
opportunities for learning from failure and the biased information provided by only 
reporting on successes, it is recommended that more M4P programmes incorporate 
case studies of failure in their evaluations. 
 
3.22 When combining the results of bottom-up evaluations of a number of interventions 
care must be taken because14: 
• Many indicators may be defined in different ways in different contexts. This may 
result in the aggregation of inconsistent units. 
• There is a risk of double counting between interventions and components – e.g. at 
the impact level between employment and income effects. 
• By aggregating results from individual interventions or components, there is a risk 
that the impact of synergies between programme parts is missed. 
 
3.23 Many of the evaluations reviewed were not fully clear on whether these factors were 
taken into account in aggregation processes. An example of good practice is 
PrOpCom:  
 
“Overlaps due to PrOpCom’s interventions are likely since PrOpCom works in both value chains and 
cross cutting sectors, moreover these interventions in many cases occur in the same geographical locations 
and hence are likely to reach the same beneficiaries. Therefore, when aggregating impact the M&E team 
will identify the overlapping interventions and the areas where overlaps are likely and take steps to account 
for those”.  
 
Top-Down (Programme-Based) Approach  
3.24 Programme-wide evaluations can capture the effects of the overall programme, which 
can help in capturing synergistic effects between multiple interventions and also prove 
useful for accountability purposes. However, the breadth of interventions means that 
programme-wide evaluation can be challenging and resource intensive, whilst 
evaluating the effects of discreet interventions can provide opportunities for in-depth 
learning about what is working, not working, and why. 
 
3.25 None of the programmes reviewed as part of this study applied a top-down 
programme based approach to evaluation. 
 
Combination (Top-down and Bottom-up) Approach 
3.26 A third approach is to bring together the intervention based and programme based 
evaluation approaches. This approach can enable the triangulation of evidence of 
change, a reasonably robust approach to measuring attribution and minimise self-
                                                          
14 Itad (2012). 
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importance bias. The approach recognises the difficulty of assessing the influence of 
interventions at outcome and impact levels without a broader understanding of sectoral 
social and economic performance. 
 
3.27 The approach entails synthesising and cross-checking the results of top-down and 
bottom-up measurement by focusing on the levels where the two steps come together 
at the output and outcome levels. It assesses the extent to which the outputs and 
outcomes achieved by programme interventions are consistent with the market-level 
factors that have driven changes in impact level indicators. This allows summarising, 
synthesising and double-checking of results.  
 
3.28 Of the evaluations that applied rigorous quantitative methods to their impact 
assessment, there was very limited triangulation of evidence of wider sector change 
through a top-down approach. In stakeholder consultations, it was generally agreed 
that combining a top-down with a bottom-up approach could add depth and rigour to 
evaluation findings, although caution was raised with regard to the additional resources 
and information requirements that would be required for this in many cases. 
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Recommendations for good practice 
• A combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to measurement is most 
likely to address the inherent drawbacks of applying either approach on its own. 
• The selection of interventions for evaluation is important in determining its efficiency 
and effectiveness. A number of factors need to be taken into account in selecting 
interventions for evaluation, including: 
o The strength of the assumptions and causal links in the programme’s theory of 
change, and the need to generate further evidence to support them. 
o The evaluability of the interventions. 
o The resources available for the evaluation and a consideration of the optimal 
balance between breadth and depth. 
o The need to avoid selection bias and the tendency to only select success 
stories. 
o For longitudinal impact evaluations, there is significant risk associated with 
selecting a small number of interventions at the baseline of an evaluation, 
given that some may be dropped, or adjusted so significantly that quantitative 
baselines become obsolete. 
o Care must be taken when aggregating results to ensure the consistency and 
accuracy of conclusions made.  
 
3.5 What: Levels of measurement 
3.29 Our review of the results frameworks used in M4P evaluations has shown that they are 
generally very linear in nature; mirroring the levels espoused in the M4P strategic 
framework and DFID logframe (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: A linear logic model is often applied but can be unhelpful for M4P 
evaluation 
 
3.30 In the selection of indicators for the measurement of impact, four evaluations 
considered poverty impact, eight considered household income, nine considered 
effects on jobs, and eleven considered impacts on enterprise income (note that some 
evaluations considered more than one of these indicators). In most cases, these impact 
indicators were only measured in relation to the direct effects of programme 
interventions. 
 
3.31 The use of linear results frameworks often fails to capture the complex interactions and 
feedback loops that exist within the results chains of M4P interventions. Indicators set 
at each level in the results chain generally ignore indirect, systemic effects, which is the 
channel through which M4P programmes seek to achieve significant impact (see 
Figure 3). Therefore applying a direct, linear approach to results measurement presents 
a risk that evaluations will miss many of the results which M4P programmes are 
inherently designed to achieve. This approach can equally risk overestimating impacts 
through inaccurate assumptions about linkages between various levels of results.  
 
Figure 3: A systemic logical model for M4P enables better capture of M4P impact  
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3.32 Evaluations need to place more emphasis on assessing the extent to which systemic 
market change, sustainability and large-scale impact has been achieved (i.e. point b in 
Figure 3) to help assess the degree to which the underlying objectives of M4P 
programmes have been achieved. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 consider in detail the extent to 
which the evaluations reviewed have done this. 
 
Box 3: Complexity and systems 
Concepts from complexity science are increasingly being applied to the implementation of 
market interventions and arguably should equally be applied to their evaluation.  
The systems that M4P programmes seek to alter can be considered to be ‘complex’ - they are 
nonlinear, dynamic, and relatively unpredictable. They consist of multiple interconnected 
and interdependent pieces. One small shift could catalyse a substantive change in the entire 
system, and it can be difficult to know with certainty the nature and magnitude of that 
change in advance.  
Complex initiatives require evaluation strategies that account for their unpredictable, adaptive 
and non-linear nature. This typically involves the use of a theory of change (in which the 
assumptions about the linkages between the intervention and the desired outcome are 
articulated, tested, and revisited frequently), mixed methods and triangulation, and 
approaches that allow for the capture of unanticipated effects (also called ‘emergence’)15. 
Osorio-Cortes and Jenal (2013) also detail some of the implications for applying complexity 
science to monitoring and evaluating market development programmes. 
 
Recommendations for good practice 
• Linear results frameworks run the risk of mis-estimating impact and are not suitable 
for evaluating M4P programmes. Instead, M4P evaluations should explicitly focus on 
assessing the extent to which systemic market change, sustainability and large-scale 
impact have been achieved. This can be achieved through an evaluation approach 
that is based on and frequently revisits and tests the linkages and assumptions in the 
project's theory of change. 
 
  
                                                          
15 Patton 2011, Rogers 2008, Funnel and Rogers 2011, Forss et al 2011. 
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4. M4P evaluation methods 
4.1 This section provides an analysis of how M4P programmes have been evaluated. It 
begins with a discussion of the issues associated with assessing attribution and 
contribution and then reviews the following considerations in the evaluation of M4P 
programmes: 
• Methods.  
• M4P facilitative and adaptive approach. 
• Systemic change in markets. 
• Sustainability. 
• Large-scale impact. 
• Unintended effects. 
 
4.1 Assessing attribution and contribution 
4.2 Attribution, as defined by the OECD DAC (2010), is the ascription of a causal link 
between observed (or expected to be observed) changes and a specific intervention. In 
other words, attribution is “the extent of change that can be claimed by a project/intervention 
out of total change that takes place” (Sen 2013). 
 
4.3 M4P interventions operate as part of a wider system where, in nearly all cases, they 
interact in some way with other public and private activities to achieve their intended 
results. Interventions aim to catalyse change, inducing spill-over effects to indirectly 
scale up change. Most interventions can therefore be seen as a ‘contributory’ cause – 
i.e. the intervention is a vital part of a ‘package’ of causal factors that are together 
sufficient to produce the intended effect. On its own, however, the intervention may 
not be sufficient, nor even necessary, to achieve a desired result. It is important, 
therefore, to appreciate the position of the intervention within a wide range of causal 
factors, and to understand that external factors have an important influence on the scale 
and nature of change. Moreover, the importance of external factors and complexity of 
the problem becomes greater as we move further away from the initial intervention to 
look at the final poverty-reduction impacts (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Attribution – causality and external influence 
 
4.4 Our review of the literature points to two broad schools of thought on addressing 
attribution for M4P programmes (including in external evaluations and internal impact 
assessments):  
• The complexity of the contribution chain makes attribution impossible. 
For example, USAID’s guidelines on assessing the effectiveness of economic 
growth programmes indicate that it is “impossible to prove attribution” when the 
intervention aims to generate changes in the business enabling environment, such 
as government regulations and strategies (Creevey et al 2010). David Snowden 
argues: “One of the things you have to start to show donors is how their funding […] had a 
positive impact on the area but you can‘t show actual attribution because it‘s dependent on 
other things that are going on at the same time”16. Such arguments are made particularly 
strongly for the ‘higher’ levels in an intervention’s results chain or theory of 
change, such as assigning attribution of an intervention to increased household 
income or poverty reduction.  
• Efforts should be made to assign attribution by isolating and accurately 
measuring the particular contribution of an intervention and ensuring that causality 
runs from the intervention to the result. For example, the DCED Standard 
requires “a clear and appropriate system for estimating attributable changes in all key 
indicators”, although it accepts that “some programmes (for example improving the 
business environment) are creating pre-conditions for development outcomes, rather than 
stimulating actual change. Attribution (and measurement of impact) may be more difficult in 
such cases”17. In assigning attribution, purely measuring ‘direct impacts’ can often 
                                                          
16 Osorio-Cortes & Jenal (2013). 
17 It is worth noting that the DCED Standard has been developed for private sector interventions in general, and is not limited 
to M4P approaches, which focus on achieving systemic change. 
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under-estimate the effectiveness of an M4P intervention, especially when 
evaluations are conducted before the most significant effects of systemic changes 
(copying or crowding in, for example) have fully emerged. Conversely, evaluations 
can over-estimate the effects of the programme when other contributory factors 
are not adequately considered.   
 
Recommendations for good practice 
• Determining attribution or contribution of M4P programmes towards observed 
results presents a number of challenges. Many of the changes M4P programmes seek 
to achieve are long-term in nature and embedded within extremely complex systems. 
As such, many other contributory factors also tend to affect the results, thereby 
making attribution to any one intervention very difficult to ascribe. Evaluations 
should therefore seek to ascertain the extent to which changes are systemic, carefully 
consider other contributory factors, and additionally collect data over an appropriate 
period of time following an intervention to capture long-term changes and measure 
sustainability.   
 
4.2 Evaluation methods 
4.5 M4P evaluations apply a variety of methods. Below we review some of the most 
popular methods, including quasi-experimental approaches, multiplier calculations, 
other quantitative methods, mixed-methods, and theory-based approaches.   
 
4.6 Quasi-experimental methods aim to estimate attribution by comparing the 
‘treatment’ with counterfactuals based on comparisons with a control group. Quasi-
experimental difference-in-difference analysis is most commonly applied: five 
evaluations applied quasi-experimental approaches (all difference in difference) to 
measuring impact. All of these evaluations undertook their own primary data 
collection activities. 
 
4.7 Quasi-experimental approaches have the potential to provide ‘hard data’ for measuring 
the discreet impacts of specific interventions, which can be useful at pilot stages or for 
‘proving’ purposes. Some mature projects (e.g. Katalyst), incorporate quasi-
experimental work as part of the programme's on-going monitoring and learning 
processes. However, they are not suited to capturing whether changes are systemic, 
sustainable or large-scale. In addition they can be difficult to implement well due to 
the changing and adaptive nature of M4P programmes. For example, the PROFIT 
programme in Zambia experienced a shift in target location for its interventions in the 
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cotton sector, which meant that ex-ante baseline data for evaluation in that sector was 
of no utility18. 
 
4.8 Before-and-after approaches: Most of the other evaluations that applied 
quantitative approaches to the evaluation used simple before/after analysis and relied 
on internal monitoring data. Whilst often preferred as a quantitative method because of 
its simplicity, the approach risks overestimating attributable results because there is no 
consideration of the counterfactual.  
 
4.9 Statistical rigour: Much of the data used to provide quantitative evidence in M4P 
evaluations relies on small sample sizes with little consideration of sampling frames, 
statistical significance or selection bias. Exceptions include the Katalyst19 and PROFIT 
Zambia20 evaluations, in which the strengths and weaknesses of data sources are 
extensively discussed by the evaluation team. In general, M4P evaluations need to be 
far more transparent about the confidence levels of quantitative evaluations, accepting 
that achieving high levels of statistical significance are challenging to achieve for M4P 
programmes.  
 
4.10 Multiplier calculations: The use of multipliers to calculate programme impacts (e.g. 
Keynesian multipliers) is common in the estimation of private sector programme 
impacts. The 2007 GTZ cross-section of PSD evaluations reviewed the multiplier 
calculations and assumptions made in PSD evaluations and concluded that “an 
automatic link between growth and employment and thus with poverty reduction is 
usually presumed... this automatic connection does not always exist, however”. It is 
therefore important to be explicit about and test the assumed linkages and pathways for 
impact.  
 
4.11 Katalyst also uses multiplier calculations in its monitoring system to provide 
quantitative estimates of impact: for example, the extent to which innovations were 
expanded to other players, areas and sectors. Consistent with the DCED Standard, 
these calculations are based on the assumptions made explicit in the results chain, and 
these are recorded for transparency. This enables the calculations and the assumptions 
on which they are based to be revisited and tested throughout the programme and by 
external stakeholders (including via auditing processes).   
 
4.12 Assumptions that are critical to claims of impact should ideally be subject to external 
validation, but also through consultation with relevant stakeholders external to the 
project implementation and to the evaluation team. 
                                                          
18 The evaluation report states, ‘Because of the specific limitations of this study and general shortcomings of quasi-experimental approaches, 
most of the findings cited in this report should be regarded as suggestive rather than definitively proven’ (DAI 2010:3). 
19 Magill & Woller (2010). 
20 DAI (2010). 
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4.13 Mixed Methods: Where statistical confidence levels are low, quantitative evidence 
can still have value, so long as it is triangulated with alternative evidence using mixed 
methods. The PROFIT Zambia evaluation provides an example of where mixed 
methods provide value in making up for unanticipated failure of a data source: one of 
the strongest sources of data, the household surveys, was rendered obsolete due to a 
change in location of project interventions. This particular evaluation was fortunately 
able to rely on other sources of information, but effective triangulation was not 
possible. Thus the adaptive nature of M4P programmes means that they cannot rely 
too heavily on data sets (e.g. baseline and control groups) identified ex ante.    
 
4.14 Mixing qualitative with quantitative methods also helps in combining statistical proof 
of a relationship from quantitative methods with evidence of ‘why’ from qualitative 
methods. 
 
4.15 The majority of evaluations reviewed included qualitative consultations with 
stakeholder as a form of validation or triangulation for quantitative data. However 
triangulation of evidence was weak. This was largely due to either (a) weak 
triangulation and/or data collection practices, or (b) unanticipated failure of one or 
more of the evaluation methods. The evaluations did not include a detailed account of 
the methodologies used for qualitative information gathering. The common risks of 
bias in qualitative evaluation – on the part of both respondents and evaluators – are 
detailed by White and Phillips (2013), who provide suggestions for increased rigour in 
‘small n’ evaluations21. Given the importance of qualitative information for M4P 
evaluations, and the significant risk of various types of bias, higher standards are needed 
for the collection and analysis of qualitative information in M4P evaluations.   
 
4.16 Theory-based approaches: A theory of change or results chain can be used in both 
attribution and contribution approaches. In a results chain, calculations are made based 
on assumptions that one change (e.g. increased employment) will lead to another (e.g. 
poverty reduction). In a theory of change, the intervention is described as one of many 
contributory causes to the outcome and the evaluation attempts to establish if there are 
plausible causal links between each step and to document and account for other 
contributory factors.  
 
4.17 The use of a theory of change is recognised as good practice in evaluating complex 
initiatives (Hivos 2009, Funnel and Rogers 2011, Rogers 2008, Patton 2010) to both 
improve programme management for results and track changes to which the 
programme might have contributed. However, in order to be useful, theories of 
change must include (a) an explicit articulation of assumptions, (b) rationale on which 
they are based, (c) identification of alternate pathways of change, (d) identification of 
other factors in the system: in-links (contributing to change) and out-links (changed by 
                                                          
21 Drawing on work of Pawson and Tilley (2004), Chambers (2006), Davies and Dart (2005), Neubert (2010) and others. 
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the programme). They should be (e) validated externally (e.g. by stakeholders outside 
of the project or external evaluators), and (f) revisited frequently as the system, and/or 
the programme team’s understanding of it, evolves over the course of programme 
implementation.   
 
4.18 While the majority of the programme evaluations reviewed included a theory of 
change (often labelled as a results chain), they generally did not meet the above basic 
criteria and instead resembled more of a simple logic model. The Joint SDC-Irish Aid 
Review of MMDPP, for example, focused only on intended, positive effects and did 
not test the assumptions in the theory of change. The PROFIT Zambia impact 
assessment included a discussion of the causal chain but this did not entail consideration 
of possible negative or unintended effects. In the SECO Business Environment 
Reform Evaluation, the evaluation team designed a generic results chain to facilitate 
the evaluation, though this was a single, linear chain focused only on intended impacts. 
The links in the chain were partially examined with a theoretical lens (as opposed to 
being tested through data collection). Again, this was also identified as a problem by 
the GTZ evaluation review team. 
 
4.19 For programmes engaging in complex adaptive systems, a theory-based approach 
presents a number of risks in relation to the integrity of the evaluation, which must be 
carefully taken into account in the application of the approach:  
• Overstatement of the causal contribution of the intervention. 
• ‘Goal displacement’, ‘where original targets are met even though this undercuts the 
actual goals of the intervention’ (Patton 2008:34), due to ‘premature selection’ of 
solutions based primarily on the point of view of the NGO or donor (Osorio-
Cortes and Jenal 2013:3). 
• Lack of anticipation and capture of unintended consequences (positive and 
negative). 
 
4.20 More thorough articulations of theories of change can help improve the use of theories 
of change for M4P evaluations by: (i) embracing complexity; (ii) encompassing 
external points of view; and (iii) frequently revisiting them as the project evolves.    
 
4.21 The Enterprise Challenge Fund Mid-Term Review presents an example of good 
practice in evaluations based on theory of change. The evaluation team explicitly 
examined the programme’s theory of change and found it to be lacking causal logic 
and supporting evidence, leading to recommendations for revised programme logic for 
more coherence.   
  
   M4P Evaluation Methods 
 
31 
Recommendations for good practice 
• M4P evaluations should apply a theory-based, mixed methods approach which uses a 
range of evaluation methods to test the causal links contained in a programme theory 
of change. This approach relies on the development of a robust theory of change and 
should (i) explicitly embrace complexity; (ii) encompass external points of view; and 
(iii) be frequently revisited and tested. Where engaged, an independent evaluator 
should ideally be engaged in reviewing, and sometimes working with the project in 
developing, the theory of change.  
• Quasi-experimental methods can provide rigorous quantitative evidence of impact. 
However they are only able to measure relatively direct impacts and are therefore 
most effective when testing discrete components of the programme, or at the pilot 
stages of an intervention before significant contamination becomes a factor in the 
measurement process. Quasi-experimental approaches are risky for M4P interventions 
as the adaptive nature of the approach risks making baseline design obsolete as an 
intervention evolves. 
• Quantitative evaluations should be explicit about the statistical confidence level in 
their findings and the strength of the assumptions used to support their calculations. 
This is rarely done in current practice, particularly for internally conducted impact 
assessments.  
• Qualitative evidence is important for triangulating and providing explanations for 
quantitative findings. There is significant scope for increased rigour and improved 
documentation in the qualitative evaluation methods applied to address the risk of 
bias in evaluation findings.  
 
4.3 Evaluation of the M4P facilitative and adaptive approach 
4.22 The facilitative role and adaptive nature of the M4P implementation approach is 
described by advocates of the approach as a desirable response to the drawbacks of 
programmes that apply a more rigid and ‘direct delivery’ approach.  
 
4.23 Several evaluations have considered the relevance of this approach: 
• The final evaluation of the Enter-Growth project in Sri Lanka reflects positively on 
the fact that the project had acted as a catalyst for change and operated in an 
innovative and risk taking manner. It does this by comparing the project’s “market 
focus” approach with a more “conventional enterprise focus” to enterprise 
development. 
• The Katalyst external impact assessment is more critical of the way in which the 
programme approached its facilitative role. It concludes that many of the 
programme’s interventions were too “hands-off” and included inadequate follow 
up, reinforcement or monitoring. It also concludes that there was an absence of 
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programme synergies and that the DBSM programme was implemented in a very 
compartmentalised way, rather than fostering a cohesive or comprehensive 
approach to solving the situations faced in the different sectors. The issues were too 
narrowly defined and too isolated, with the result that some opportunities to 
relieve bottlenecks or address identifiable constraints were not implemented. 
• The USAID ‘Understanding Facilitation’ Briefing Paper22 points to a number of 
benefits of using a facilitative approach and provides concrete examples of how it 
has: (i) built the capacity of existing actors and institutions; (ii) fostered stronger 
relationships among them to create incentives for upgrading; and (iii) increased the 
probability of reaching greater scale by targeting interventions at leverage points. 
 
4.24 It is important to recognise that a facilitative and adaptive approach to programme 
implementation in itself creates challenges for the evaluator:  
• A facilitative role presents challenges in defining of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ 
groups. Programme implementers often don’t have control over what the 
treatment is: “The problem with widespread changes that are owned and sustained by large 
numbers of market actors is that the more success the project has, the harder it becomes to 
establish causality!”23. Interventions are less direct in nature and therefore linkages 
between interventions and results at the level of households is non-linear and 
indirect.  
• An adaptive approach creates problems for longitudinal impact evaluations 
because target populations, and the nature of the intended change, may change as 
the programme evolves. A strong example of where this challenge was faced is in 
the PROFIT impact assessment. 
 
4.25 None of the evaluations considered in this study explicitly compare the benefit of the 
facilitative approach to that of alternative approaches. 
 
Recommendations for good practice  
• Evaluations should not take for granted that an adaptive and facilitative approach is 
optimal. It is desirable for evaluations to consider the relevance of the M4P approach 
alongside a ‘counterfactual’ direct delivery approach to achieving desired impacts in a 
similar context.  
• The theory of change supporting the intervention should explicitly identify 
assumptions relating to the benefits of the facilitative approach (e.g. sustainability and 
large-scale impact) and the risks inherent within it (e.g. more unintended 
consequences). The evaluation should test the assumptions which are less well 
supported by evidence and of most concern to the evaluator and project team. 
                                                          
22 USAID (undated). 
23 Osorio-Cortes & Jenal (2013). 
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4.4 Evaluation of systemic change in markets 
Definition of systemic change 
4.26 Systemic change is defined as transformation in the structure or dynamics of a system 
that lead to impacts on large numbers of people, either in their material conditions or 
in their behaviour. Systemic approaches aim to catalyse change, inducing spill-over 
effects to indirectly drive and scale up change.  
 
Evaluation challenges 
4.27 Systemic changes will normally only be observed through indirect beneficiaries, whose 
context, relationships and developmental status are affected by the system itself, not by 
the intervention. If evaluations do not look beyond direct beneficiaries to broader 
considerations of changes in the structures and dynamics of the market system with 
indirect effects on the target populations, they will be superficial. 
 
4.28 This poses a challenge in attributing changes to an intervention because: 
• External factors have an increasing influence on the scale and nature of change 
further up the results chain.  
• A facilitation approach often makes the distinction between groups that are 
“treated” and “untreated” unclear. 
• It is difficult to distinguish which target groups are actually driving change.  
 
Systemic change indicators and measurement methods 
4.29 Systemic change in markets is frequently slow, involves multiple people or businesses, 
and often relates to attitudes or social norms that are difficult to observe. It is 
challenging to define generically ex-ante, and is highly context-specific. The DCED 
suggests the following possible indicators of systemic change24, which are variously 
considered in some of the evaluations that we have reviewed: 
• Crowding in: The programme helps targeted enterprises provide a new service, 
by supplying training or improving the market environment. Other enterprises see 
that this service can be profitable, and start supplying it as well. For example, a 
programme helps agricultural suppliers start up pesticide spraying services. Other 
agricultural input suppliers, who did not receive any direct input from the 
programme, might then start up a similar service.  
• Copying: The programme improves the practices of targeted enterprises, to 
improve the quality or efficiency of production. Other entrepreneurs can see the 
positive impact of these new practices, and adopts them in their own business. For 
example, if a shoe making entrepreneur sees that his rival has improved the quality 
                                                          
24 Kessler & Sen (2013). 
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of his shoes; he copies the quality improvements and so also gets higher prices for 
his goods.  
• Sector growth: Programme activities cause the targeted sectors to grow. 
Consequently, existing enterprises expand their businesses and new entrants come 
into the market.  
• Backward and forward linkages: Changes in the market can trigger changes at 
other points along the value chain. For example, a programme increases the 
amount of maize cultivated. This benefits not just farmers, but others in the value 
chain, such as van drivers who transport maize. They receive more business as 
there is a greater amount of maize to transport.  
• Other indirect impact: As a result of programme activities, other indirect 
impacts may occur in completely different sectors. For example, if a programme 
increases the income of pig producers, they can spend more on consumer goods, 
benefiting other shops in the local area. 
 
4.30 There is currently little guidance on how to measure systemic change. The DCED 
suggests that the methods chosen to assess systemic change link back to the results 
chains, are appropriate to the programme context, take attribution into account and 
conform to good research practices. It also suggests that it is useful to keep the direct 
and indirect impact channel separate from each other all the way up to the goal-level 
impacts, as it helps the programme to add up impact separately if desired. Moreover, 
since there is often a time lag between when direct beneficiaries feel an impact and 
when indirect beneficiaries subsequently copy their performance, it is helpful to record 
their changes in separate channels. 
 
4.31 Our review has found that only five of 14 evaluations considered systemic change to a 
satisfactory degree. Examples of where it was done relatively well include: 
• The PrOpCom tractor leasing case study report, where systemic change was 
measured through the extent of copying of the business model by enterprises and 
service providers. 
• The Enter-Growth final evaluation, which considered the extent to which business 
environment reform achievements helped build momentum and support for other 
project interventions. 
• The Enterprise Challenge Fund mid-term review raises as a concern the fact that 
the ECF had a lack of conceptual clarity about what systemic change might mean, 
and how the ECF can support such a vision practically. The review suggests that 
systemic change can be demonstrated in two ways: firstly, the project itself is so 
large that in itself it can be considered as systemic; and secondly, it is through 
innovation, resulting in clear demonstration which then leads to wider take up and 
adoption which in turn delivers wider change. 
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• Katalyst measures systemic impact using a framework consisting of the stages of 
adoption, adaptation, expansion and response. 
 
Recommendations for good practice 
• Systemic change should be explicitly included in the theory of change of M4P 
programmes and carefully considered in evaluations. The theory of change must clearly 
define the system to be changed (e.g. the markets, geographies, common processes or 
organisations) and the assumptions regarding the ways in which this systemic change 
will be realised. This is essential in order to enable the evaluation to test these 
assumptions and find out if and how systemic change took place in practice. The 
indicators selected to assess systemic change inevitably need to be context-specific, but 
should generally relate to signs of replication, crowding in, and wider market change.  
• Systemic changes are difficult to measure quantitatively and a more ‘journalistic’ 
approach is normally required through dialogue with project partners and other market 
stakeholders. However, once signs of systemic change have been identified, it should 
in many cases be possible to assign numerical estimates to the level of outreach, or the 
degree of sector growth or income increase that the systemic change has achieved. 
 
4.5 Evaluation of sustainability 
Definition of sustainability 
4.32 M4P evaluations and associated M&E guidance varies in the extent to which 
sustainability is considered in a static or dynamic sense. Arguably, only dynamic 
considerations of sustainability will take full account of the extent to which systemic 
changes become embedded within the market: 
• Static sustainability is defined as the extent to which the status quo (in terms of 
the results achieved through an intervention) will be maintained after external 
support is withdrawn. In other words, the extent to which the project’s legacy is 
maintained. 
• Dynamic sustainability is defined as the achievement of structural change to the 
market system which enhances its resilience to shocks and stresses through 
evolution or innovation in response to changing external factors. Achieving this 
dimension of sustainability is arguably integral to the M4P approach in that it 
moves beyond outward or superficial market performance to look more deeply at 
the critical underlying, but often less visible, institutions and functions that 
determine systemic functioning. Dynamic sustainability is inherently linked with 
significant systems change. 
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Evaluation challenges 
4.33 If successful, the impact of an M4P intervention is likely to grow after it ends. In many 
cases, the opposite is true for ‘direct delivery’ programmes. This means that evaluations 
can only assess the full impact of M4P programmes if they are undertaken some time 
after the programme ends, or if they at least provide projections of future impact at the 
time of measurement. However, as time progresses, it becomes more difficult to 
disentangle the effects that can be attributed to the M4P intervention. 
 
Sustainability indicators and measurement methods 
4.34 Our review has found that consideration of sustainability in M4P evaluations is 
surprisingly weak. Where it is considered, a range of indicators are used, including the 
following: 
• Behaviours maintained after external support/intervention concludes. 
• The commercial viability of a new business model after external support is 
withdrawn - e.g. the Enterprise Challenge Fund mid-term review.  
• Private and public sector investment catalysed (as proxies for partners’ buy-in to 
change, and hence the sustainability of change) – e.g. PrOpCom (2011).  
• Institutional or structural change, for example through: 
o New or better relationships: firms in new or modified vertical or horizontal 
relationships have experienced win-win outcomes that lead to greater trust 
and continued incentives to cooperate. 
o Aligned incentives: when incentives for change are positive for all actors in 
the new market model, the likelihood of sustainability is high. 
• The extent to which the market system is becoming more adaptable (dynamic 
sustainability). For example, as mentioned above, Katalyst’s internal results 
measurement system defines the stages of adoption, adaptation, expansion and 
response. The concept of sustainability is considered to be linked with expansion 
and response. This implies that fundamental market change cannot be considered 
to be sustainable if a small number of market players directly engaged by a project’s 
intervention are adopting a change. An indicator of dynamic sustainability is 
therefore where programme partners or service providers begin innovating new 
products (beyond the scope of the original intervention) to exploit the gaps in the 
service market, where the likelihood of sustainability is high. 
 
4.35 The PrOpCom PCR brings together many of these indicators to assess the 
sustainability and points to evidence of the following as signs of sustainability: 
• Well-aligned incentives: when incentives for change are positive for all actors in 
the new market model, the likelihood of sustainability is high. 
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• Capacity development of service providers: when partners show greater 
organisational capacity, market changes are more likely to be sustained. 
• Creation of space for innovation within markets: when programme partners 
or service providers begin innovating new products (beyond the scope of the 
original intervention) to exploit the gaps in the service market, the likelihood of 
sustainability is high. 
• Leveraged investment: this measure of investment indicates the level of 
commitment of our private sector partners to the change introduced; commitment 
signals continuity. 
 
Recommendations for good practice 
• Sustainability should be explicitly considered in evaluations and defined in terms of 
both static and dynamic sustainability. Indicators of sustainability should relate to 
evidence of lasting change to institutions and behaviours of market participants, as 
well as the commercial viability of new business models or other innovations that are 
introduced. Evaluation data should be collected several years after an intervention has 
concluded to assess the extent to which impacts achieved are sustained after project 
activities have ended. 
 
4.6 Evaluation of large-scale impact 
Definition of large-scale impact 
4.36 M4P programmes are designed to achieve large-scale change, benefitting large 
numbers of poor people beyond the programme’s direct sphere of interaction. 
Interventions explicitly envisage mechanisms for replicating, extending or multiplying 
results so that, at least potentially, they could reach very large numbers of beneficiaries. 
While ‘large’ is often relative, we can take it to mean that the scale of the impact is 
many times larger than what could be achieved directly. The achievement of large-
scale impact is closely linked with market system change that is systemic and 
sustainable. 
 
Evaluation challenges 
4.37 A successful M4P programme will have widespread effects. This presents challenges in 
establishing control and treatment groups and in attributing wider market change 
beyond the direct scope of an intervention. 
 
Large-scale impact indicators and measurement methods 
4.38 A key indicator of large-scale impact is that results achieved affect ‘indirect 
beneficiaries’ – i.e. people or enterprises who are not specifically targeted by the 
intervention, or who fall outside of its direct sphere of influence. Large-scale effects are 
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best measured by assessing the impact (in terms of increased incomes, jobs or reduced 
poverty) of systemic change achieved through a programme.  
 
4.39 As highlighted above, consideration of systemic change in the evaluations reviewed 
was weak. Where it was considered, little effort was made to measure the impact of the 
systemic change achieved. 
 
Recommendations for good practice 
• The achievement of large-scale impact is closely linked with market system change 
that is systemic and sustainable. M4P evaluations should seek to assess the indirect 
(positive and negative) impacts of the programme and the extent to which project 
facilitation has played a role in the scaling up of successful elements of interventions. 
Estimates can relatively plausibly be made by: (i) clearly defining the systemic changes 
achieved; (ii) estimating the reach and depth of these changes; (iii) applying a mixed 
methods approach to assigning attribution. 
 
4.7 Evaluation of unintended consequences 
4.40 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines impact as ‘the positive and 
negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, 
intended or unintended’ (OECD 2010). Capturing all effects, rather than just focusing 
on the positive or intended effects, is imperative for all programming, but is especially 
relevant to M4P programmes due to factors of systemic, large-scale change and 
complexity. Because of these factors, the implications of unintended effects (both 
positive and negative) are potentially great and therefore need to be monitored and 
evaluated effectively to allow for any necessary course correction.     
 
4.41 Measuring unintended effects requires open-ended and flexible approaches to 
evaluation (e.g. semi-structured interviews) that allow for ‘emergence’ of the 
unanticipated. The construction of a ‘negative program theory’ (Funnel and Rogers 
2011) can also facilitate the identification of possible unintended impacts.  
 
4.42 The evaluations reviewed were extremely weak in considering and capturing 
unintended and negative effects, which may relate to the lack of incentive to do so as 
well as theory of change models that often do not consider risk explicitly or in 
sufficient depth. Common unintended effects such as displacement (benefitting some 
enterprises or populations at the expense of others) and environmental impacts were 
largely overlooked by M4P evaluations. Gendered assessments of M4P programme 
impacts were largely limited to disaggregation of direct effects by gender and did not 
capture changes in social relations, roles and power, which can lead to superficial 
conclusions about the gendered effects of a programme (Sahan and Fischer-Mackey 
2011). This was corroborated in stakeholder consultations.  
  
   M4P Evaluation Methods 
 
39 
Recommendations for good practice  
• Significant consideration of possible unintended consequences is a must for M4P 
evaluation given the unpredictable nature of M4P and potential scales of impact. 
Theory of change models should explicitly consider risk and be revisited frequently. 
As well as considering economic effects on non-target populations, evaluations should 
aim to capture changes in social relations, roles and power. Environmental impacts 
and displacement are also common unintended effects and should be considered in 
evaluations.  
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
5.1 M4P programmes are characterised by playing a facilitative, adaptive role in order to 
contribute to systemic, large-scale and sustainable market changes that positively affect 
the poor. The nature of the approach and the complexity of the markets within which 
it operates present a number of challenges for evaluation. 
 
5.2 Because of these challenges and the relatively recent development of the M4P 
approach, there are, unsurprisingly, very few examples of good practice in M4P 
evaluation to date.  
 
5.3 The M4P evaluations reviewed were often weak in terms of: 
• consideration of systemic, sustainable changes in market systems; 
• the rigour of data collection practices;  
• triangulation approaches; 
• the development and use of theories of change; 
• consistency in units for facilitating accurate aggregation; and 
• consideration of unintended negative effects. 
 
5.4 While there has been learning in this area, and significant improvements in practices 
and approaches, there remains considerable room for improvement. The following 
recommendations are based on our review of existing practices and consultations with 
stakeholders in this field.  
 
5.5 Institutional arrangements that achieve an optimal balance between objectivity and 
in-depth knowledge of the intervention and context should include: internal data 
collection with external audits and/or longitudinal collaborations between the 
evaluator and evaluand. 
 
5.6 Evaluation needs to happen both (a) during the programme, to ensure contributions 
are measurable and help facilitate an adaptive approach, and (b) later on (at the end or 
post-project), when systemic, long-term change has had time to unfold. This justifies 
the application of a longitudinal approach to evaluation. 
 
5.7 A combination of top-down and bottom-up measurement is likely to address the 
inherent drawbacks of each approach. In selecting interventions for evaluation, one 
needs to consider the evaluability of the interventions, resources available, balance 
between breadth and depth, and bias in selecting only success stories. 
 
5.8 Determining attribution or contribution of M4P programmes towards results 
presents a number of challenges in that many of the systemic changes M4P 
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programmes seek to achieve are long-term in nature, and many other contributory 
causes of a given result exist. Evaluations should therefore seek to ascertain the extent 
to which changes are systemic, carefully consider other contributory factors, and 
additionally collect data an appropriate amount of time following an intervention. 
 
5.9 A mixed methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative approaches and 
based on a theory of change is well-suited to evaluating M4P programmes. The 
theory of change should (i) explicitly embrace complexity; (ii) encompass external 
points of view; and (iii) be frequently revisited and tested throughout the programme.  
 
5.10 Quasi experimental approaches are risky for M4P interventions as the adaptive 
nature of the approach risks making baseline design obsolete as an intervention evolves. 
Where successful, these methods can provide rigorous quantitative evidence of impact. 
However they are only able to measure relatively direct impacts and are therefore most 
effective at the pilot stage of an intervention before significant contamination becomes 
a factor. Quantitative evaluations in general need to be more explicit about the 
statistical confidence level in their findings.  
 
5.11 Qualitative evidence is often necessary for triangulating and providing explanations 
for quantitative findings. There is significant scope for increased rigour and improved 
documentation in the qualitative evaluation methods applied to address the risk of bias 
in evaluation findings.  
 
5.12 The M4P approach was specifically developed to increase effectiveness and efficiency 
in comparison with direct-delivery approaches. However, evaluations should consider 
the relevance of the facilitative and adaptive M4P approach in comparison with a 
possible direct delivery approach to achieving desired impacts in a similar context. 
 
5.13 Linear results frameworks present significant risks of both over and under 
estimating impact and are not suitable for evaluating M4P programmes. Instead, M4P 
evaluations should explicitly focus on assessing the extent to which systemic and 
sustainable market change and large-scale impact have been achieved. 
 
5.14 The indicators selected to assess systemic change inevitably need be context-specific, 
but should generally relate to signs of replication, crowding in, and wider market 
change. These changes are very difficult to measure quantitatively and qualitative 
approaches are normally required. However, once signs of systemic change have been 
identified, it is often possible to estimate quantitative impacts. 
 
5.15 Sustainability of changes should be defined in terms of both static and dynamic 
sustainability. Indicators of sustainability should relate to evidence of lasting change to 
institutions and behaviours of market participants, as well as the commercial viability of 
new business models or other innovations that are introduced. Evaluation data should 
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be collected several years after an intervention has concluded to assess the extent to 
which impacts continue in the long-term.  
 
5.16 The achievement of large scale impact is closely linked with market system change 
that is systemic and sustainable, and can be plausibly estimated by: (i) clearly defining 
the systemic changes achieved; (ii) estimating the reach and depth of these changes; 
(iii) applying a mixed methods approach to assigning attribution. 
 
5.17 Significant consideration of unintended consequences is a must for M4P evaluation 
given the probability and scale of possible unintended impacts and should include 
economic effects on non-target populations, displacement, environmental impacts, and 
changes in social relations, roles and power.   
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Annex 3: Summary of evaluations reviewed 
Ranking of Evidence Framework 
Evidence 
score 
Ranking of evidence Description of ranking 
1 Strong The finding is consistently supported by a full range of evidence sources, including documentary sources, quantitative analysis and qualitative evidence (i.e. there is very good 
triangulation); or the evidence sources, while not comprehensive, are of high quality and reliable to draw a conclusion (e.g. strong quantitative evidence with adequate 
sample sizes and no major data quality or reliability issues; or a wide range of reliable qualitative sources, across which there is good triangulation). 
2 More than satisfactory There are at least two different sources of evidence with good triangulation across evidence, but the coverage of the evidence is not complete.  
3 Indicative but not conclusive There is only one evidence source of good quality, and no triangulation with other sources of evidence. 
4 Weak There is no triangulation and/ or evidence is limited to a single source and is relatively weak. 
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
1. Katalyst: 
Impact 
assessment of 
four business 
service 
market 
development 
activities 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation 
During Longitudinal 
quasi 
experimental 
(difference in 
difference) 
FGDs, 
interviews, 
secondary 
data 
By 
evaluation 
team 
 
3 
Considered 
but not 
effectively 
measured 
3 
Measured 
qualitatively 
but 
superficially 
2 
Considered but 
unable to assess 
well due to 
timing 
    
2. 
Cambodia 
MSME 
project final 
monitoring 
and 
evaluation 
report 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation 
End of 
project 
Before/after. 
Randomised 
sample selected 
 By 
evaluation 
team 
 
3 
Some 
assessment of 
spill over – 
spread of 
technologies 
to non-direct 
beneficiaries 
4 
Not 
considered 
4 
Not considered 
    
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
3. AgLink 
Egypt final 
report 
External review  
End of 
project 
None Process 
evaluation 
based on 
project 
monitoring 
information 
Interviews 
undertaken 
by 
evaluation 
team. 
Quantitativ
e data 
sourced 
from 
monitoring 
information 
 
4 
Not explicitly 
considered 
3 
Consideration 
of 
“institutionalis
ation” of 
AgLink 
activities 
3 
Consideration 
of 
“institutionalisati
on” of AgLink 
activities     
4. 
PrOpCom 
Project 
Completion 
Report Internal results 
measurement 
End of 
project 
Before/after.  
No 
counterfactuals. 
Methodologies 
used to measure 
impacts not 
clearly specified. 
Project 
narrative. 
Programme 
monitoring 
based on 
DCED 
standard 
(mock audit 
conducted 
Sept 2010). 
Internal 
monitoring 
data 
 
3 
Consideratio
n of signs of 
crowding in 
for some 
interventions 
3 
Some 
consideration 
of wider 
market 
change 
2 
Well considered 
framework for 
assessing 
sustainability of 
interventions 
    
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
5. 
Independent 
evaluation of 
SECO 
Cooperatio
n in 
Business 
Environme
nt Reform 
External review Meta 
evaluation – 
during / 
end of 
project 
None Literature 
review 
Case study in 
Serbia 
Relied on 
secondary 
data in the 
form of 
results 
reporting 
from 
selected 
projects 
  
Generic results 
chain  
developed 
4 
Evaluation 
found very 
limited and 
weak 
evidence of 
impact 
4 
Not 
considered 
2 
Sustainability 
ranking 
provided for 
each project 
reviewed 
    
6. Impacts of 
the KBDS & 
KHDP 
projects in the 
tree fruit 
value chain 
in Kenya 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation 
End of 
project 
Panel survey. 
Longitudinal 
quasi 
experimental 
(difference in 
difference) 
FGDs & 
individual 
interviews 
with sub-
sample of 
value chain 
actors 
By 
evaluation 
team 
 
4 
Not 
considered 
4 
Not 
considered 
2 
“Sustainability 
impacts” 
explicitly 
considered 
    
7. 
Effectiveness 
assessment of 
the GMED 
India 
project 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation 
During  Randomised 
sample design. 
Longitudinal 
quasi 
experimental  
(difference in 
difference) 
Process 
evaluation 
Qualitative 
field study 
Local 
research 
partner 
 
4 
Not 
considered 
4 
Not 
considered 
2 
Creation of 
sustainable 
vertical linkages 
explicitly 
considered 
    
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
8. Second 
Prosperity 
Initiative 
Impact 
Assessment 
Report, 
second 
Thanh Hoa 
bamboo  
survey 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation 
During Matched 
difference in 
difference. 
Hedonic 
pricing analysis. 
None By 
evaluation 
team 
 
4 
Not 
considered 
4 
Not 
considered 
4 
Not considered 
    
9. 
PrOpCom 
tractor 
leasing case 
study report 
Internal results 
measurement 
During Before/after 
based on survey 
of tractor service 
providers & 
farmers.  
Control groups 
included in 
survey 
Interviews & 
monitoring 
data 
Internal 
monitoring 
data 
 
2 
Evidence of 
copying & 
crowding in 
provided 
2 
Measured 
through 
extent of 
copying by 
enterprises & 
service 
providers 
2 
Strong criteria 
developed to 
measure 
sustainability 
    
                                    Annex 3: Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
53 
Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
10. Enter-
Growth 
Project Sri 
Lanka, Final 
Evaluation 
External review End of 
project 
Internally 
conducted 
Impact 
Assessment 
reports 
(documents 
unavailable at 
time of writing) 
Cultural 
assessment 
(open-ended 
interviews, 
FGDs) 
Primary 
data 
collected by 
implementi
ng partner 
rather than 
evaluation 
team 
 
Evaluation 
team 
conducted 
stakeholder 
interviews, 
workshop 
 
2 
Considered 
in the 
evaluation 
2 
Considered in 
the evaluation 
 
 
2 
There is a plan 
to measure 
poverty 
reduction 2 to 3 
years after 
project close 
    
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
11. 
PROFIT 
Zambia 
Impact 
Assessment 
Final Report 
Independent 
impact 
evaluation 
End of 
project 
 
*though 
most of data 
is from 2 
years into 
the 5 year 
project 
Longitudinal, 
quasi-
experimental 
mixed methods  
 
Interviews, 
FGDs 
By 
evaluation 
team 
 
Focus on 
intended, 
positive effects 
3 
Large 
number of 
HHs 
included but 
only in target 
areas which 
caused ‘severe 
problems’ 
when 
location 
shifted 
2 
Agent model 
being 
replicated 
3 
Considered in 
evaluation but 
not assessed 
    
12. Joint 
SDC – Irish 
Aid Review 
of the 
Mekong 
Market 
Developme
nt Portfolio 
Programme 
(MMDPP) 
Internal results 
measurement 
End of 
project 
 
Compleme
nts previous 
evaluation  
Reports from 
firms, processors 
and pre-
processors 
HH income 
surveys in 
selected 
bamboo areas 
Primary 
data 
collected by 
firm - PI 
(Prosperity 
Initiative 
Communit
y Interest 
Company)  
 
Focus on 
intended, 
positive effects, 
assumptions not 
tested 
3 
Considered 
but not 
effectively 
measured 
2 
Business 
environment 
reform 
evaluated 
3 
Considered 
through logic 
chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
13. 
Enterprise 
Challenge 
Fund Mid-
term review 
External review 
Mid-
project 
 Consultations 
and project 
visits 
Primary 
data 
collected by 
project 
team  
(including 
baselines), 
reviewed 
by external 
team, 
compleme
nted with 
visits and 
consultation
s 
 
Assessed in the 
evaluation 
(found to be 
lacking causal 
logic) 
3 
Considered 
in the 
evaluation 
(recommend
ations 
provided for 
better data 
collection to 
differentiate 
between 
outreach and 
impact) 
 
2 
Considered in 
the evaluation 
(recommend
ations 
provided for 
better data 
collection) 
2 
 
 
    
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Summary of Evaluations Reviewed 
Evaluation 
reviewed 
Evaluation 
institutional 
arrangement   
Timing 
of 
evaluation 
Methods Primary 
data 
collection 
Use of 
programme 
theory 
Evaluation of M4P attributes – ranking of 
evidence* 
Impact indicators measured 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Large scale 
impact 
Systemic 
change 
Sustainability Poverty 
HH 
Income 
Jobs 
Enterprise 
Income 
14. Cross-
section of 
independent 
evaluations 
in PSD 
2007 GTZ 
External review 
7 Mid-
project,  
 
6 End-
project,  
 
4 Post-
Project 
Evaluations 
were based on 
Keynesian 
employment 
and income 
multiplier; 
assumed link 
between 
growth and 
employment 
and thus with 
poverty 
reduction 
N/A Review of 
evaluation 
reports 
 
 
Difficult to 
assess 
2 1 
 
Reviewed and 
rated for all 
projects 
 
** this reflects 
the review and 
not the 
programme 
evaluations 
    
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Annex 4: List of individuals and organisations consulted 
Name Position Organisation 
Markus Kupper Director, Monitoring and Results 
Measurement for Katalyst 
Swisscontact 
Goetz Ebbecke General Manager, Katalyst Swisscontact 
Manish Pandey Regional Director, South Asia Swisscontact 
Liz Kirk Global Advisor - Private Sector 
Programme Policy Team 
Oxfam GB 
Gareth Davies Senior Manager Adam Smith International  
Bill Grant Senior Principal Development Specialist, 
Economic Growth 
DAI 
David Elliot Director Springfield Centre 
Alan Gibson Director Springfield Centre 
Simon Calvert Evaluation Adviser – Private Sector, 
Growth and Trade 
DFID 
Adrian Stone Evaluation Adviser – Private Sector, 
Growth and Trade 
DFID 
Catherine Martin Principal Strategy Officer, East Asia and 
Pacific Department 
IFC 
Jeanne Downing Senior Business Development Services 
(BDS) Advisor 
USAID 
Jim Tomecko Senior Adviser AIPD-Rural, AusAID Independent consultant 
Alopi Latukefu Director, Food Security Policy / Food 
Security, Mining, Infrastructure and Trade 
AusAID 
Jim Tanburn Coordinator Donor Committee for 
Enterprise Development 
Aly Miehlbradt Consultant  Independent  
Marcus Jenal Consultant SDC 
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